In the way that you stick you hand into your jeans pockets and find an unexpected high denomination bill neatly folded-up, we find that VMware has announced entered into a definitive agreement to acquire Wanova and in turn integrate their Mirage desktop management product into VMware’s End-User Computing (EUC) portfolio.
This acquisition does indeed represent a very exciting and strategic addition for VMware. The combination of VMware View and Wanova Mirage will be an an industry first pairing that could well dramatically redefine the VDI market: and first because there are no other products that operate like Mirage. It is increasingly common to find vendors acknowledging that a VDI-only solution is not enough. Citrix know it. Desktone know it. Quest know it. Virtual Bridges know it. We’ve critiqued before that by having a VDI only view, VMware doesn’t “get” desktops. With their Wanova acquisition VMware is no longer restricted to only delivering centrally hosted virtual desktops.
What is it that Wanova’s Mirage can offer, and how does Mirage differ from other solutions?
There have been several interesting posts in the blogosphere about virtualization security and how to measure it. Specifically, the discussions are really about the size of the hypervisor footprint or about the size of patches. But hypervisor footprints from a security perspective are neither of these. The concern when dealing with hypervisor security is about Risk, not about the size of the hypervisor or the size of a patch it is purely about the Risks associated with the hypervisor in terms if confidentiality, availability, and integrity. Vendors who claim that security is proportional to the size (in GBs) of the hypervisor footprint are spreading FUD. Continue reading Measuring Hypervisor Footprints→
There is an interesting discussion about this on the VMware Communities on just this subject. It is interesting given the vulnerability being discussed is CVE-2009-1244 (or VMware’s ID VMSA-2009-0006) which relate to Guest Operating System driver vulnerabilities in hosted environment. It relates specifically to paravirtualized video drivers allowing the possibility of code to run within the host from within the Guest OS. In other words, escaping the VM. Continue reading Hosted Virtualization Security – Type 2 Hypervisors→